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They say he cherished men, He reckoned right and wrong
Their happiness, and then By felicity-lifelong
Calmly assumed one could And by such artless measure
Devise cures for their good As the quality of pleasure
Believing all men the same For pain he had a plan
And happiness their aim Absurd old gentleman.'
Jeremy Bentham was an eccentric
personality, an incredibly prolific
writer, a thinker who had the colossal
temerity to attempt to catalogue
and to label all varieties of human
behavior and the motivations giving
rise to them. With this information
in hand, as he pointed out with dis-
arming simplicity, he believed that
he could select the precisely proper
procedures to control human actions
and direct them into desirable chan-
nels.
It is periodically fashionable to
resurrect an old philosopher, such as
Bentham, dust him off, and present
him as the author of contempora-
neously significant prose. This is
probably a function of the vested
interest the researcher acquires in
his subject. In some cases, undoubt-
edly, a writer actually has been un- JEREMY BENTHAM
duly neglected.
1 HELEN BEVINGTON, A Bomb for Jeremy Bentham, in NINETEEN MILLION ELEPHANTS AND
OTHER POEMS. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950, p. 33. Reprinted by permission of Miss Bevington.
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Such is not the case, however, with Bentham. A very large part of Benthan's
thought is badly dated. Reading his works may not arouse the froth that drove
Karl Marx to immortalize Bentham (in a certain way, at least) with the bombastic
assertion that "in no time and in no country has the most homespun commonplace
ever strutted about in so self-satisfied a way."'2 But neither will it likely impress the
present-day criminologist with its immediate relevance, particularly in the sphere
of criminological theory.
With the above in mind, then, the direction of the present paper can be labeled.
No attempt will be made to detail all of Bentham's major postulations, but only
those will be treated which appear to have interest or value for contemporary times.
This will lead to a skewed portrait of Bentham's production. Often minor points
will be taken out of context if the remainder of the context is not presently relevant.
Thus, for instance, an elaborate reproduction of Bentham's catalogue of types of
crimes would appear meaningless now; yet, within this catalogue there is an occa-
sional differentiation which has today the germ of a neat analytical separation.
This paper will discuss: First, Bentham's life and times; second, his theories of
criminality; and third, his unique contribution to penology-the Panopticon prison
design.
BENTHAM'S LIFE AND TIMES
All sources comment on Bentham's extreme precocity, both intellectual and
artistic. This precocity combined with a retarded physical growth during his early
years to give rise to a badly unbalanced developmental pattern. One can further
note briefly the few Freudian-tinted remarks that biographers have placed on the
record.3
Bentham's relationship with women, for instance, was very unusual. His mother
died when he was eleven and Bentham did not get along well with his stepmother.
He never married and is said to have formed a close romantic attachment with
only one woman in his life; indeed, it is reported that at the age of 57 he proposed
to this lady but was rejected.
Bentham did not get along easily with other persons. "He shrank from the world
in which he was easily browbeaten to the study in which he could reign supreme,"
one writer notes 4 providing background explanation, perhaps, for one of the most
2 KARL MARX, CAPITAL: A C=RIQUE O r CAPITALISTIC PRODucTION. New York: Modern Library,
n.d., p. 668. Marx applied a further epithet to Bentham which has since become a Soviet dicb6.
"Bentham," he wrote, "is a genius of bourgeoise stupidity."
3 The standard biography of Bentham is considered to be that by his executor, JoHx Bovinmo,
THE WoRxs or JEaRY BENTAm. Edinburg: Tait, 1843, vol. I and vol. XI. This work is used
extensively and often exclusively in later studies for biographical information on Bentham.
Everett, however, maintains that Bowring ("who had in some way wriggled his way into the
old man's esteem") wrote a "hasty and inaccurate Life." (Cinemas WARREN EVERETr, Editor's
Introduction, in JERMY BENTHAM, Tan LnuTs op JuisPnuDnncE DErnam. New York: Columbia
University Press, 1945, p. 28). EvxaEnT's own work, TnE EDucATiON or JEnmr- BENTAI. New
York: Columbia University Press, 1931, is an interesting source containing much new information
on Bentham's life as gleaned from the voluminous unpublished Bentham papers stored in the Uni-
versity College and the British Museum in London.
4Lxsri STErEx, Ta ENGLisH UTTARm'S. New York: G. P. Putnam's, 1900, Vol. I, p. 175.
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telling criticisms of Bentham's work on crime-its total failure to consider criminals
as human beings, as live, complicated, variegated personalities.
Sir Norwood East neatly puts a finger on this shortcoming: "It is interesting to
note," East points out, "that in the index to the text of Bentham's volume on The
Theory of Legislation reference is made to crime, offenses, and criminality, but none
to criminals or offenders. In fact, although (Bentham's) school was seriously con-
cerned with abolishing injustices and the vindictiveness of punishment, and believed
that the function of punishment was solely deterrent, it paid little attention to
the individuality of the offender." 5
It is likely that Bentham's need for neat catalogues-catalogues which could be
be stated with specific details and without the diverse elements inevitably occurring
when the human being per se is considered, accounts for the philosopher's concentra-
tion on crime in the abstract. His was arm-chair criminology, in which a keen, rather
pedantic mind inductively derived sweeping principles of human behavior and
supported them sometimes with historical citations and, more often, with con-
structed examples. The advantage was that the trivia of empirical minutiae did not
obstruct far-ranging insight; the disadvantage, that the reality of empirical truth
was not allowed to infiltrate into mental machinations.
Bentham, of course, was intensely influenced by the times in which he worked.
Against these times, he towers as a giant, fearlessly challenging the assumptions of
criminal law. Phillipson characterizes the criminal codes of Bentham's time as "a
mass of incongruities, absurdities, contradictions and barbarities" and notes further
that:
There had been a capricious, unsystematic accumulation of statutes aimed at the same crime
for which earlier provisions were allowed to remain unrepealed. Different penalties existed for the
same offenses. Different forms of indictment were necessary for crimes which were similar funda-
mentally, but varied in certain minor particulars. Thus in the case of receiving stolen goods, several
laws were applicable; but one referred exclusively to pewter-pots, another was confined to precious
metals; and neither could be used as against receivers of horses or banknotes....
There was no consistency, no harmony, no method whatever in the legislation. The law was in
theory one thing, and in practice it was often another. The infliction of punishments was to a large
extent left to the arbitrary and capricious discretion of the judge.. so that from circuit to circuit
practices varied to an extraordinary degree, sometimes being marked by ferocious violence, at other
times by unpardonable weakness. The punishments threatened by law could not be more rigorous.
The spasmodic prescription of measures of extreme severity and ferocity was evidently thought
to be an effective panacea for the preventing or curing of the country's criminal ills. Many laws
were laid down whose violation was actually disregarded. The somewhat indiscriminate classifica-
tion of crimes into felonies and misdemeanors, the outworn technical rules respecting "benefit of
clergy" were fertile sources of abuse, evasion and injustice. Innocent persons were liable to become
the victims of an irrationally applied law; the guilty could cherish a hope of impunity-and very
frequently were their hopes fulfilled.6
It was against this chaotic background-a background, incidentally, that finds
some echoes in contemporary conditions-that Bentham did his work. He attempted
to arrange affairs into a harmonious unity, and brought to bear on illegal behavior a
6NonwooD EAST, SocrETY AmD T=E CRrMNAL. Springfield, Ill.: C. C. Thomas, 1951, p. 98.
6 CLEm.N PmIln'soN, THREE CRIMINAL LAW RFxomSizs: BEcCAA, BENTHAm, RomsIsy.
New York: Dutton, 1923, pp. 166-168.
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multiplicity of analytical concepts such as felicity calculus, greatest happiness, pain
and pleasure, and utility.
BENTHAm'S THEORIES Or CRIME
Bentham undertook the gigantic task of expounding a comprehensive code of
ethics, but believed that such an undertaking alone was sterile-too non-utilitarian-
and he therefore put great emphasis on the practical problem of eliminating or at
least decreasing crime. He was in this sense aiming at a system of social control; a
method of checking human behavior according to a general ethical principle. The
ethical principle was utilitarianism: An act is not to be judged by an irrational
system of absolutes but by a supposedly verifiable principle. The principle-one
that had been enunciated by a long line of thinkers prior to Bentham 7-was that of
"the greatest happiness for the greatest number" or simply "the greatest happiness."
An act, Bentham said, possesses utility "if it tends to produce benefit, advantage,
pleasure, good or happiness (all this in the present case comes to the same thing) or
(which again comes to the same thing) to prevent the happening of mischief, pain,
evil or unhappiness to the party whose interest is considered."' To measure the
"goodness" or "badness" of an act Benthhm introduced the pseudo-mathematical
concept of felicity calculus. In his writings, however, statements of felicity calculus
invariably deteriorate into long-winded attempts to explain verbally the method of
arithmetically arriving at the quantitative weights to be attached to various items
of behavior. But the actual carrying out of the operation is not undertaken nor are
the ultimate implications of such a procedure considered.
Bentham was certainly aware of the infinite ramifications of any given act-
criminal or non-criminal-but this did not deter him from the claim that these
ramifications couid be tagged and weighed within his conceptual framework. At one
point, for instance, Bentham notes that the single honking of a goose some thousand
years previous undoubtedly had significant effects on every aspect of life today,
and he even attempts to name some of these effects and to rate their importance.
The presumptuousness of such an effort appears incomprehensible to humbler minds,
particularly since Bentham had no criteria but his own feelings for determining the
ultimate utility of an act and of the endless waves that it sets into motion.
Bentham's basic concern with "happiness" rather than with "utility" again
reflects his dedication to practical affairs. He was thinking, one commentator de-
clares, "of the... welfare... of the community as composed of individuals"
rather than being "merely concerned with barren speculative theory."' It is the
failure to lay a sound theoretical foundation, however, that has undermined the
lasting value of Bentham's work.
Bentham, nonetheless, possessed an extremely fertile mind and it turned its
7For a detailed discussion of the background of the concept see The Principle of Utility and
Bentham's Place in its History in DAvID BAUMGART, BENTHAM AND THE ETHIcs or TODAY. Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 1952, pp. 33-60.
8 JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRiNcrpLEs or MoRALs AND LEGISLATION. Edited
by Laurence J. Lafleur. New York: Hafner, 1948, p. 2.
'Wn.i-w L. DAViDsON, POLITICAL THOUGHT IN ENGLAND: THE UTILITARIANS FROM BENTHAM
To J. S. Miss.. New York: Henry Holt, 1916, pp. 48-49.
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attention on many problems which later thinkers have often not solved but only
avoided. These are some of the criminological concepts that form segments of
Bentham's work:
Motivation.-The influence of psychiatric theory on the interpretation of criminal
action has primarily been in terms of a concentration on the motives underlying
human behavior. Human beings, we now believe, attempt to satisfy their needs in a
number of ways, some legal and some illegal (social definitions), but the thesis that
some needs are universal has had extensive implications for criminological theory.
In contrast to the seeming sophistication of the present psychiatric stress on
motivation, Bentham's efforts appear rather juvenile. He was unaware, reasonably
enough, of the unconscious genesis of human behavior. Bentham believed that all
men pursued their cnds deliberately, after rational consideration of the divergent
elements involved. Persons today, on the other hand, as Larrabee points out, "have
been made [awate], as Bentham never was, of the more insidious dangers of deceiving
themselves.... Bentham ... was much too sure that he was always on the side of
the angels, and that his opponents were plagued by evil motives rather than by
apathy and ignorance."' 0
Motives--or "springs of action" as Bentham labels them," using a term from
mechanics to suit his so-called dynamic moralityu-refer to "anything that can
contribute to give birth to or even to prevent, any kind of action." Beyond the
definition, Bentham's exposition is more interminable than illuminating. His ex-
haustive list of motives can be well summarized with the not-undeserved sarcasm it
drew from a contemporary reviewer:
"In multiplying these distinctions and divisions ... Mr. Bentham appears to
bear resemblance... to one of the old scholastic doctors, who substituted classifica-
tion for reasoning, and looked upon the ten categories as the most useful of all
human inventions," the critic wrote. "Though much acuteness and industry may be
displayed in finding them out, the discovery is just as unprofitable to science as the
enumeration of the dissyllables in the decalogue would be to the6logy." 3
Sophistical as they are, the tables of motives are stage setters for the future
elaboration of Bentham's theory. For basically, he avows, all human action is
reducible to one simple formula of motivation: The pursuit of pleasure and the
concomitant avoidance of pain.
"Motive necessarily refers to action," Bentham writes. "Pleasure, pain, or other
events prompt the action." And, "It follows, therefore, immediately and incon-
10 HAROLD A. LAmn E, Editor's Preface, in JERmS. BETnM, HANBOOKx or POLITICAL FAL-
LACIES. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1952, p. ix.
1 Bentham's writings on motives can be found in various sections of AN INTRODUCTION TO
PRInCPLES or MORALS AND LEGISLATION, and in A Table of te Springs of Action which is reprinted
in BowRING, WoRKs, Vol. I, pp. 195-219.
12 ELIE HAlVY, THE GaownH or PnsosoPmc RDUICALsm. Translated from the French by
Mary Morris. New York: Macmillan, 1928, p. 459. The best bibliography of Bentham's works
has been compiled by Everett and appears in this volume, pp. 522-546.
1 FANCIS JEPFREY, CoNTmRIuToNs TO T=E EDINBuRG REzvEw. London: Longman, Brown,




testably, that there is no such thing as any sort of motive that is in itself a bad one."
It is only the consequence of the motive that can be bad because of its effect on
others, because of its ultimate influence.
Bentham does point out, amusingly, a criminal court lesson in semantics as he
proceeds through his labyrinth of motive delineation. He calls attention to the
ethical valuation that is deeply rooted in the language of motivation and notes the
preponderance of defamatory words in contrast to praiseworthy denominations and
even more so in contrast to neutrally-toned designations. The love of wealth, for
example, possesses a large number of derogatory names such as "avarice, covetous-
ness, rapacity, niggardliness" and only a few relatively appreciative labels such as
"frugality." But the motive, regardless of the connotation of the word chosen to tag
it, remains precisely the same.
Bentham flirts continuously in his discourse on motivation with one of the most
important tenets of criminological theory; namely, that criminal behavior is generally
learned behavior. But he actually never comes to intimate grips with the idea. He
deserves considerable credit, nonetheless, for his adherence to a theory of social
(i.e., pleasure pursuit) causation of crime rather than a concept of biological, climatic,
or other non-social causation.
The problem of why certain persons pursue criminal patterns in their quest of
happiness while others do not is not considered deeply by Bentham. His only answer
would seem to be that the external given situation is such that, without adequate
deterrence (pain), any person in the situation would act in a criminal manner.
This fails to take cognizance of the variations in the individuals facing the given
situation. It is not the individuals who vary, Bentham believes, but the situations
which are different. Bentham could easily incorporate stereotyped acts in his theory.
But he avoids examples which are, to him, promiscuous variations of clearcut,
readily understandable behavior. And his understanding and interpretation of
behavior is always in terms of his own perception of what seems reasonable in a
given context.
Put another way: It appears to be futile to attempt to determine how much pain
(punishment) can effectively deter homicide, even after homicide is broken down
into innumerable analytical categories in terms of exact amounts of premeditation
and precise particles of malice aforethought. A general, statistical answer can be
given to the question, but the basic fact that evaded Bentham is that there are some
individuals who simply do not conceive of homicide as one of a number of solutions
to whatever problem presses them, while others turn to homicide immediately as
representing the only possible solution.
Mitchell has adequately summarized the shortcomings of Bentham's work on
motivation. "The real reason we find this concept artificial," he notes, "is that we
have another stock of ideas about behavior with which Bentham's views are in-
compatible." 14
Social Control.-It is obvious that all persons might derive considerable pleasure
from uncontrolled orgies of criminal behavior if there were no checks-no pains-




attached to this behavior. These checks, or sanctions as Bentham designated them,
may be set up by legislation, and they serve to bring the individual's pursuit of his
own happiness in line with the best interests of the society as a whole.
The bold assumption is further made that the gain of individual happiness by a
person in the society inevitably contributes to the total happiness of the society
as a whole. As Sorokin has pointed out, Bentham does not take into account the
basic idea that what gives happiness to the greatest number of human beings does
not necessarily bring the maximum of happiness to some individuals; and what gives
the most happiness to some persons does not necessarily give the maximum happiness
to all.'"
Bentham dearly recognized that any legal sanction must be acceptable to the
majority of the poeple before it will be effective. He was aware of other items of
social control too, items oftentimes more effective than the legislated don'ts. He
called the sanctions physical, political, moral (or popular), and religious. Everett
illustrates their operation and differentiation with a case of drunkenness:
If a man suffers from a headache as a result of drunkenness, that may be styled a punishment
of the physical sanction; if he is fined or imprisoned by the sentence of a magistrate, it is a punish-
ment of the political sanction; if his neighbors refused to associate with him on account of dislike
for his moral character, that is a punishment of the moral sanction; if a Mohammedan, he may
suffer from the fear of God's displeasure for having violated a precept of the Koran, and is thus
punished by the religious sanction. 8
Bentham advocated social engineering primarily in the realm of political sanctions
since this is the most malleable area in the pleasure-pain equation. He dismissed
any idea of recourse to traditional or natural law ("nonsense on stilts" he caustically
labelled the latter).
Deterrence and Punishment.-The nature of conduct could be evaluated, Bentham
believed, by considering its consequences. Present criminologists, on the other hand,
would probably say that the consequences of an act (and this is particularly true
in the sociolegal handling of juvenile delinquents) are not nearly as important as the
personality and the attitudes of the offender. Though the law would not pose the
question, the criminologist should: What difference in terms of the offender does it
make whether a bullet, intended to kill, proves lethal or merely injures slightly?
Bentham made very worth-while advances in the rationalizing of criminal juris-
prudence by insisting that the function of law should not be to achieve vengeance
for a criminal act, but to prevent the commission of the act. That he did not dearly
understand the connection between laws and their effect on deterring crime is not
surprising. We still do not adequately comprehend the complexities of this relation-
ship, and our laws still are a mosaic of disjointed ideas without empirically-founded
substance.
On capital punishment, for instance, Bentham pointed out that afflictive execu-
tions, as he calls excutions in which extraordinary brutality is used to carry out the
killing, are not satisfactory punishments because they produce more pain than is
Is Prrmu A. SoRozmu, SocIETY, CuLT=, Aim PzRsoAITy: TnEm STRucTu AN DYNuAMCS.
New York: Harper, 1947, p. 575.
s EvearETr, Tan EnUCimmm or JEamv BaTaAsm , p. 190.
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necessary for the purpose. In general, Bentham's reasoning on capital punishment
is very keen. Consider, for example, his arguments against extensive capital punish-
ment statutes when public opinion does not support them. In such cases, he notes,
the following occurs:
1. It makes perjury appear meritorious, by founding it on humanity;
2. It produces contempt for the laws, by rendering it notorious that they are not
executed;
3. It renders convictions arbitrary and pardons necessary.... [And] all these
causes of uncertainty in criminal procedure are so many encouragements to
malefactors. 17
Punishment is considered an evil, but a necessary evil to prevent greater evils
being inflicted on the society and thus diminishing happiness. Bentham presumably
does not consider the possibility that an outlawed act might actually serve to in-
crease human happiness; the dilemma so brilliantly portrayed by Dostoyevsky in
Crime and Punishment in which a murder is defined, with considerable justification,
as a social good by its perpetrator and thus morally justifiable.
The application of the principle of utility to criminal behavior produced, among
other things, one valuable insight that today is still not totally incorporated into
criminal jurisprudence. An offense, Bentham reasoned, must be productive of evil
(unhappiness: pain); otherwise, it is not an offense. Thus Bentham's measuring
stick of criminal behavior represents a neat distinguishing instrument between
acts which a society may consider meretricious and those which it should label as
criminal.
Bentham in this vein declaims against what he calls "imaginary offenses"-"acts
which produce no real evil, but which prejudice, mistake, or the ascetic influence
have caused to be regarded as offenses." To illustrate his point, Bentham points to
the case of vestal virgins who were buried alive for unchastity. Many commentators
on the criminal codes today, with Professor Kinsey in the 'vanguard, would un-
doubtedly echo a fervent agreement with the Bentham distinction between imaginary
and real offenses, particularly with the position that "offenses which originate in the
sexual appetite, when there is neither violence, fraud, nor interference with the
rights of others, and also offenses against one's self, may be arranged under this
head."18
There is another capsule of advice in Bentham's discussion of remedies-means
short of incarceration for preventing crime-that is of relevance to contemporary
events. "Never use a preventive means of a nature to do more evil than the offense
to be prevented," Bentham cautions. It is a lesson that still must be learned.
17 JREMy BENTHAm, THE RATIONALE op PuNISm MNT. Translated from the French by Richard
Smith. London: Robert Heward, 1830, pp. 196-197. This book has an odd printing history that is
not atypical of Bentham's works. It first formed the second volume of TrtowiE Ds PEnTEs ET DES
RcompENsEs (Londres, 1811) and represented the initial publication of a Bentham manuscript
which had been translated into French by Etienne Dumont. The material for the English edition
was drawn primarily from the Dumont work and is thus a translation of Bentham back into his
native language.
'
8 JEEMY BENTHAm, THEORY OF LEGISLATION. Translated from the French of Etienne Dumont
by R. Hildreth. London: Kegan Paul, 1905, pp. 245-246.
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Bentham is at his logical nadir when he attempts to impose his felicity calculus
on criminal jurisprudence in an effort to state the amount of punishment necessary
to deter various acts. His moral arithmetic falls short of reasonableness; it is, as the
poem at the outset of this discussion suggests, "an artless measure." Man is not, to
employ the words of two commentators on Bentham's work, "a human calculating
machine." 9 Bentham's theory of criminal behavior, to mention another criticism,
is unduly individualistic, intellectualistic, and voluntaristic, and "assumes freedom
of will in a manner which gives little or no possibility of further investigation of
crime or of efforts to prevent crime."
'20
But Bentham's penology--in contrast to his theories of criminal jurisprudence-
often reaches a summit that present-day climbers are still scrambling to attain.
It is short on positive suggestions, but it is strikingly sophisticated in its criticisms
of illogical punishment. Penology is not the heart of Bentham's work but, to this
writer, his pronouncements on the subject constitute the most lasting segment of
his extensive publications in criminology 2 '
Bentham is particularly adept at analyzing the various types of punishment in
terms of their pragmatic usefulness to the society. The aims of punishment, he
avers, are to prevent recidivism and to deter others from the commission of similar
offenses. Here, Bentham cannot separate the two goals in a workable fashion (and he
is certainly not alone in this). He has no logical answer, for instance, to the problem
of the murderer who commits a single offense and then no longer, by statistical
probability, represents a threat to the society. In Bentham's theory of utility, for
any offense that can be regarded as an isolated incident, the like of which will never
recur, punishment is considered useless because it adds a further pain to an original
one without purpose.
Punishment should not be an act of anger, resentment, or vengeance. These types
of punishment are berated: (1) Where the punishment is groundless, since there is
no offense because consent has been given, or where the evil is more than compensated
for by an attendant good, such as in justificable homicide; (2) Where the punishment
is inefficacious because it has no power to affect the will, such as in cases of nonage,
insanity, or under circumstances where the act appears to be absolutely involuntary;
(3) Where the punishment is unprofitable because the evil of punishment exceeds
that of the offense. It would be wise, Bentham notes in this connection, to pardon an
offender who is protected by a foreign state whose goodwill it is essential to obtain;
and (4) Where the punishment is needless because the end may be obtained as
effectually at a cheaper price "by instruction, for instance, by informing the under-
standing..
19 HARRY EL.VER BARNES Aum HowARD BECKER. SOCIAL THOUGHT F ROM LOPE TO SCIENCE.
Boston: D. C. Heath, 1938, Vol. I, p. 259.20 EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, PRINcIPLEs OF CRIMINOLOGY. Revised by DONALD R. CRESsEY.
5th edition. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1955, p. 53.
21 This judgment, it might be said, is shared by at least one Benthamite. Atkinson has written
that "no part.., is more luminous, or possesses greater living interest, than the author's enunda-
tion of the general principles of punishment." CHARLES Mrn= AmTSON, JEREMY BENTHAM,
HIs LIE AND WORK. London: Methuen, 1905, p. 139.
2 BENTHAM, RATIO'NALE Or PUNISHMENT, pp. 23-26.
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Also enunciated are two principles which still have not obtained adequate recog-
nition: First, the general concept that the less certain the punishment the more
severe it must be if it is to have any possibility of deterrence; and second, that
overtly equivalent punishments are not really equivalent because of the variations
among the offenders. A fine to the rich man may be a mild punishment, while the
same fine to the poor man may impose severe hardships.
Bentham's notes on imprisonment also have a contemporary ring: "An ordinary
prison is a school in which wickedness is taught by surer means than can ever be
employed for the inculcation of virtue .... United by a common interest, theprisoners
assist each other in throwing off the yoke of shame.... Upon the ruins of honor is
built a new honor, composed of falsehood, fearlessness under disgrace, forgetfulness
of the future, and hostility.z'n
Bentham also devotes considerable attention to a philosophy of crime prevention
along the lines that today underlie the theory of delinquency control. He notes that
the problem can be approached both by making it impossible for a person to acquire
knowledge necessary to commit an offense or by redirecting the will to commit the
offense. The pre-delinquent may then be acted upon both physically and psycho-
logically. One can, for instance, prohibit the sale of instruments used in counter-
feiting, and one can also work to change the course of dangerous desires, to channel
inclinations towards amusements compatible with public interest, and to arrange
it so that a given desire may be satisfied without injury to the society. In a more
general fashion Bentham advocates attention to "the culture of honor, the employ-
ment of the impulse of religion, and the use to be made of the power of instruction
and education.' 'n
Bentham, however, misses the mark badly in his understanding of criminal motiva-
tion when he proposes reciprocal punishments of the type that fit the crimes' motiva-
tions. Fines should be leveled against those motivated by avarice; those who commit
offenses because of idleness should be assigned compulsory labor. Here, in philo-
sophically compounding a felony, Bentham displays a basic misunderstanding of the
roots of crime. We now believe that motivation must be treated rather than attacked.
We seek to ascertain why the man was idle. Bentham, a dynamo of activity himself,
would answer in terms of his own feelings. It would be a perverse trait-laziness.
In this sense, Bentham's criminology becomes highly subjective2 5
TE PANOPTICON PRISON
The much-maligned scheme for a utopian prison, Bentham's ill-fated Panopticon
plan, represents the philosopher's most tangible contribution to penology2 6 It is a
story of eccentricity in action. To Bentham's credit it must be remembered that
imprisonment represented a rather novel form of treatment during this period.
23BowRING, WoRxs, Vol. L (PRImIPLEs or PENAL LAW, Pt. IM.
U4 BowRNnG, WoRxs, Vol. L (PRINcIPLzs or PENAL LAW, Pt. I=.
25For an excellent discussion of this point, see LEoN RADZINowxcz, A HISroIY or ENGlISH
CRnMNAL LAW AND ITS ADmmsNTRATIoN zRO 1750: THE MovxImEm roR REroRm, 1750-1833.
New York: Macmillan, 1948, pp. 370-377.
25 The major points of Bentham's work on the Panopticon can he culled from BoWRING, WoRXS,
Vol. I, pp. 498-503; VoL IV, pp. 37-248; and Vol. XI, pp. 96-170.
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Capital punishment, fines, pillory, transportation, and assignment to prison hulks
constituted the usual method of disposing of convicted felons.F
There were two intriguing facets to the Panopticon plan. One concerns the unusual
architectural pattern for the prison, and the other the method of running the in-
stitution.
Architecturally, the Panopticon was to be a circular building with a glass roof and
containing cells on every story of the circumference. It was to be so arranged that
every cell could be visible from a central point. The omniscient prison inspector
would be kept from the sight of the prisoners by a system of blinds "unless ... he
thinks fit to show himself."
The philosophy behind the proposed prison operation was admirable, but the
precise method of carrying it out often shows more vivid imagination than practical
knowledge. The pivotal figure in the prison was to be the manager who would em-
ploy the convicts in contract labor. The manager would derive a proportion of the
money earned by the prisoners. Meanwhile, he would be financially liable if felons
once under his charge subsequently committed offenses. Further, if more than a
specified number of prisoners were to die in a given period, the manager would have
to pay a certain sum to the government. These fines were to provide incentive for
high-minded supervision of the Panopticon population. The manager would care
for the prisoners because the would be "forced to do for his own interest anything
that he was not inclined to do for them."
The prison was to be placed near the center of the city so that it would be a visible
reminder of the fruits of crime. Within the Panopticon, idleness would be eliminated
and the prisoners would be taught profitable trades. There would be a segregation
policy by classes of offender, and religious services were to be adjusted to the special
needs and tastes of the inmates. Finally, there is some anticipation of today's pre-
release units. Bentham bewails the fact that prisoners are transferred directly from
the prison into society and he recommends an intermediate stage in this process.
Bentham was convinced that the Panopticon would produce all of the following
admirable results: "Morals reformed, health preserved, industry invigorated, in-
struction diffused, public burdens lightened, economy seated as it were upon a rock,
the Gordian knot of the poor laws not cut but untied."
The Panopticon idea was something of a monomania with Bentham; its abortive
history occupies a large proportion of his time, correspondence, and thoughts. His
travail in attempting to have a Panopticon built by the British government need not
be detailed here. The episode reflects to the high credit of the various committees of
Parliament that reviewed the scheme and rejected it so that in Emgland, to use one
writer's term, the "monstrosity" was never built.28 From Bentham's viewpoint, the
Panopticon represents a prolonged case study in extraordinary frustration.
There was some little diffusion of the Panopticon idea outside of England. In
France, for instance, the National Assembly had Bentham's work printed for study,
27 An excellent description of these conditions can be found in Smy ANrD BEATRICE WEBB,
ENGLISH PRISONS UNDER LocAL GovERNmzNT. New York: Longmans, Green, 1922.
28 HARRy EI=F BARNS AND NEGLEY K. TEETERS, NEW HORIZONS IN CRmINOLOGY, 2nd edi-
tion. New York: Prentice-Hal, 1951, p. 388.
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but the project never went any further.29 Other efforts were made to have it adopted
in Ireland. A committee reported adversely upon it in New York in 1811.0
Two Panopticon-type prisons actually were constructed in the United States.
The Western State Penitentiary which opened at Pittsburgh in 1826 was modeled
to some extent on Bentham's plan. But the prison, "wholly unsuited for anything
but a fortress", was ordered rebuilt in 1833.31
In addition, from 1926-1935, Illinois constructed the Statevile prison, six miles
from Joliet, upon the Panopticon plan. After four of the circular cell houses were
built and occupied their impracticability was so obvious that it was decided to change
to a more conventional plan in completing the institution.32 The construction drew
from a noted prison architect the comment that it was "the most awful receptacle
of gloom ever devised and put together with good stone and brick and mortar. ' 3n
One of the major drawbacks at Stateville has been aptly described by a former
inmate of the institution:
I stood in the cell looking out through the bars, which were paneled with glass. In the center
of the house was a tower of tubular steel. On top of it was a round porchlike affair with large oblong
openings. Through these openings the guard kept constant watch on the cells surrounding him.
I remembered what Carl had said: "They figured they were smart building them that way. They
figured they could watch every inmate in the house with only one screw in the tower. What they
didn't figure is that the cons know all the time where the screw is, too."3'
CONCLUSION
A summing up of Bentham's contributions to criminology need not concern itself
overlong with detailed criticism. Many of the weak points in his theory have been
pointed out in the foregoing paragraphs. On the positive side, a backward look clearly
shows Bentham standing as a towering landmark along the road of criminology.
Whatever its shortcomings, the positivistic school, in which the name of Cesare
Beccaria, in particular, is associated with that of Bentham, focused a penetrating
light on illegal behavior and strenuously attempted to illuminate the avenues leading
toward control of such behavior.
Bentham attacked, and in innumerable ways succeeded in reforming, what Phil-
lipson has described as "the caprice, the barbarity, the inconsistency, the blundering
aimlessness, the arbitrary attitude, the indiscriminate excessive punishments,...
the disastrous jail system, and the other evils, all conspiring to make criminal law
and penal administration nothing less than a consummate national folly."35 The
29
ELMER Louis KAYSER. THE GRAND SOCIAL ENTERPRISE: A STUDY OF JEREMY BENTHAM IN
His RELATION TO LIBERAL NATIONALISM. New York: Columbia University Press, 1932, p. 89.
'0 FREDERICK HOWARD WINES, PUNISHMENT AND REFORMATION. New York: Crowell, 1910,
p. 146.
11 HARxY ELMER BARNEs, THE EVOLUTION Or PENOLOGY IN PENNSYLVANIA: A STUDY IN AmE -
CAN SocrLA HISTORY. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1927, pp. 138-141.
32 HANDBOOK or AMERICAN PRISONS AND REoRm.ATOREs. Edited by WILuAM B. Cox, F. LOWELL
BIXBY, AND WILLIAm T. ROOT. 4th edition. New York: Osborne Association, 1933, Vol. I, p. 145.
3 ALFRED HOPKINS, PRISONS AND PRISON BUILDING. New York: Architectural Book Publishing
Co., 1930, p. 43.
PAUL WARREN, NEXT TIE Is FOR LI E. New York: Dell, 1953, p. 139.
15 PHiLrnPsoN, THREE CRIMINAL LAw REFORMERS, p. 191.
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practical results, rather than the theoretical heritage he left behind, stand as major
monuments to Bentham. He was not a great philosopher, but he was a great reformer.
Reference might be made to just a small number of the reforms suggested by
Bentham which have either partially or wholly been enacted into law since his time:
There was the mitigation of the severity of criminal punishment; the abolition of
transportation; the adoption of a prison philosophy stressing example and reforma-
tion; removal of certain defects in jury systems; substitution of an effectual means
of appropriating and realizing a debtor's property for the practice of imprisonment;
abolition of usary laws; abolition of law taxes and fees in courts of justice; removal
of the exclusionary laws in evidence. 6 Bentham's "untiring attacks" on the com-
placency of lawyers in the face of judicial injustice are credited by Frank with the
"elimination of some of the worst features of judicial practice."x7 "He found the
practice of law an Augean stable," another writer notes. "He turned the river into
it,... sweeping away mound after mound of its rubbish." 8
Maine's panegyric on Bentham is widely quoted: "I do not know of a single law
reform effected since Bentham's time which cannot be traced to his influence," 9
he wrote. In a sense this is the highest tribute that can be raised to Bentham for it
underscores the practical utility of his achievements rather than the theoretical
wisdom of his philosophy.
36 The list is adapted from HILDA G. LuNmn, The Influece of Jeremy Bentham on English Demo-
cratlc Develov ent in UNrvxRsrry or IowA Srrmrs m THE SOCIAL ScIENs S, Vol. III, No. 3, 1920,
p. 82.
3 JERomE FRANK, CoURS ON TRI: MYTH Ai REALITY m AmECAx JusTICE. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1950, p. 91. One of the few humorous remarks in Bentham's works,
which are notoriously deficient in humor, is typical of his scorn for the legal profession. "Only the
lawyer," he wrote sarcastically, "escapes punishment for his ignorance of the law."
38 JOHN STUART MILL, MILL ON BENTA AND CorERm.GE. London: Chatto & Windus, 1950,
p. 75. The essay originally appeared in Mri.'s DISSERTATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS, 1838, Vol. I,
pp. 330-392.
39 HE RY JAMES SUmNER MAINE, LEcrms ON THE EA LY HISTORY OF INSTITUTIONS. New
York: Henry Holt, 1875, p. 397.
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